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differences research design to investigate whether state and federal welfare reform in the 1990s reduced rates
of non-marital childbearing among women aged 19 to 39 at highest risk of welfare use, relative to women
at lower risk.  We find little consistent evidence for an effect of welfare reform on non-marital childbearing.
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If anything, federal welfare reform has been associated with a small positive effect of two to three percent
for white and black women ages 19 to 39.
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“Therefore, in light of this demonstration of the crisis in our nation, it is the sense of the  
Congress that prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out-of-wedlock 
birth are very important Government interests and the policy contained in part A of Title  
IV of the Social Security Act … is intended to address the crisis.” (Findings - H.R.  
3734 – The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996) 
 
Was Congress successful?  Did welfare reform achieve one of Congress’ major goals—the 
prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and a reduction in non-marital fertility?  Surprisingly, the answer 
to this question is unknown, as evidence remains scarce even five years after the law went into effect.  
Indeed, in a recent position paper on welfare reform reauthorization, Working Toward Independence,
1 the 
Bush Administration remarks on the lack of evidence on this question and requests $100 million for 
research and demonstration projects on family formation and healthy marriages.  The Administration also 
requests $100 million in matching grants to support innovative state and local programs intended to 
reduce out-of-wedlock births.  From the Bush Administration’s perspective, therefore, welfare reform has 
not prompted states to make sufficient effort to curb nonmarital childbearing, and without such effort the 
goal of reducing nonmarital birth is less likely to be achieved. 
Data published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention bolster the view that welfare 
reform has not reduced nonmarital fertility.  Although births per 1000 unmarried women age 15 to 44 fell 
from 45.6 in 1994-96, just prior to reform, to 44.1 1997-99, just after reform.(Ventura and Bachrach 
2000), the post-reform non-marital birth rate is approximately the same as it was in the early 1990s, and 
remains high by historical standards.  Moreover, the entire decline in nonmarital fertility post-welfare 
reform is due to a decline among black women, which began in 1990, well before welfare reform (with no 
acceleration of this decline after welfare reform).  In sum, these national data would appear to suggest that 
welfare reform had little effect on nonmarital childbearing.  Although the trends in aggregate rates of non-
marital fertility are quite suggestive, a firmer conclusion requires a more refined evaluation.  In particular, 
the aggregate data do not allow an investigation of the variation in the timing and intensity of welfare 
                                                 
1 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-book.html)   3
reform in different states, nor do they focus on the populations most likely to be affected by welfare 
policy. 
Out-of-wedlock birth has been and continues to be a politically contentious issue. It is 
unfortunate, therefore, that the ongoing debate over reauthorization of the federal welfare reform act 
(PRWORA, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act), which involves 
debate over reducing non-marital births, has not been informed by much recent social science research on 
this subject.    Additional research is needed, and the purpose of this paper is to explore whether recent 
state and federal welfare reform reduced non-marital fertility in populations at highest risk of welfare use.   
 
Previous Research 
  Although there is not much research on the effect of the PRWORA and earlier state reforms on 
non-marital birth, a considerable literature has investigated the effects of the AFDC (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children) program on fertility.  Moffitt (1998) provides a comprehensive review of this 
literature, and specifically reviews evidence on the effects of AFDC on fertility, including out-of-wedlock 
birth.  Based on 68 estimates from numerous studies, he concludes that government cash assistance 
affects out-of-wedlock birth, but that the magnitude of the effect is uncertain.  Moffitt also emphasizes 
that this conclusion is subject to significant qualification because a number of studies find no effect.  For 
example, estimates from studies that control for state fixed-effects, which are generally preferred by 
analysts to estimates based on cross-state variation in welfare policy alone, reveal a decidedly mixed 
pattern of results: six find insignificant effects, 11 find significant effects (i.e., higher AFDC benefits 
increase fertility), and two report mixed results.  Although Moffitt (1998) concludes that researchers 
generally agree that welfare policy influences fertility, he regards the evidence to be too weak to support 
definitive policy recommendations.  Moreover, studies of the AFDC program may not provide evidence 
relevant to PRWORA because of the relatively small variation in welfare policy that the studies of the 
AFDC program examined.  Recent welfare reform represents a striking change from past policy, and thus   4
provides a sharper test of the effects of public assistance, and economic incentives more generally, on 
non-marital fertility. 
  As noted, there have been few studies of the effect of recent welfare reform on fertility.  In an 
experimental evaluation, Camasso et al. (1998) investigated the effect of the “family cap” provision in 
New Jersey.  This study finds that the family cap reduced the birth rate by nine percent among women 
receiving public assistance.  Horvath and Peters (2000) also studied the effect of the family cap (as well 
as other AFDC waiver provisions) on the nonmarital birth ratio, and report a similar finding.
2 
Surprisingly, other waiver provisions, such as time-limited benefits and work requirements (which are 
prominent in PRWORA), did not have a consistent effect on the nonmarital birth ratio, even though these 
policies embody stronger financial incentives than family cap provisions.  In contrast, Kearney (2001) and 
Levine (2002) find no effects of family caps on nonmarital fertility.  However, both of these studies report 
that higher AFDC benefits are associated with significant increases in nonmarital fertility, consistent with 
the conclusion reached by Moffitt (1998).  Notably, however, neither study examines the effect of the 
dramatic changes in policy that occurred as a result of PRWORA. 
  Two other studies are relevant to our analysis. Schoeni and Blank (2000) examine the effect of 
AFDC waivers and TANF on female headship and find that recent welfare reforms reduced female 
headship among less-educated women by two percentage points, or approximately eight percent.  Kaushal 
and Kaestner (2001) investigate whether time limits and family cap provisions affected birth rates among 
unmarried women.  They find that time limits reduced by 18 to 47 percent the probability that a less-
educated woman will have a non-marital birth, but the estimates are not always statistically significant. 
  To summarize, the literature provides some evidence that fertility is sensitive to changes in 
AFDC generosity, but evidence from the larger literature on whether the fertility of poor women responds 
to financial incentives is inconclusive.  Further, recent welfare reform has produced unprecedented and 
                                                 
2 Kearney (2001) criticizes Horvath and Peters (2000) for using this dependent variable because it confounds 
marriage and fertility responses.  Kearney (2000) also notes that the estimates reported in Horvath and Peters (2000) 
are quite large, perhaps implausibly so, particularly since the sample is not limited to women most at risk of welfare 
receipt.   5
dramatic shifts in the incentives for non-marital childbearing.  The most credible estimates of the effect 
on fertility of the AFDC program, by contrast, examined the relatively small changes over time in benefit 
levels within states.  Thus, little is known about the effect of current welfare reform efforts on non-marital 
fertility, and this circumstance underscores the value of the analysis we present below. 
 
Research Design and Statistical Methods 
  The hypothesis underlying our empirical analysis is the following.  Recent state and federal 
welfare reform, which, among other provisions, limits cash assistance to five years and requires work in 
return for cash assistance, has increased the (expected) cost of raising children, especially for single 
parents.  In response, women or couples, particularly those who were most likely to avail themselves of 
public assistance after a birth, will reduce non-marital fertility.  This hypothesis is consistent with a 
number of behavioral models of fertility that share the common assumption that women respond to 
economic incentives (e.g., money cost of fertility control) when making fertility decisions.
3 
  To examine this hypothesis, we use a “pre- and post-test with comparison group” research design, 
which is often referred to as a difference-in-differences (DD) approach.
4  The pre- and post-test periods 
correspond to pre- and post-welfare reform.  We define target and comparison groups on the basis of 
mother’s education and marital status.  We define two target groups: unmarried women with less than 12 
years of education and unmarried women with 12 years of education.  Similarly, we define two 
comparison groups: married women with less than 12 years of education and unmarried women with 
between 13 and 15 years of education. Education and marital status are important predictors of welfare 
use (see Table 1).  Unmarried, less-educated women have high rates of welfare receipt and are likely to be 
affected by welfare reform; married, less-educated women and unmarried women with more than a high 
school degree have low rates of welfare receipt and are unlikely to be affected.  We provide further 
                                                 
3 See for example, Becker (1981), Becker and Lewis (1973), Michael and Willis (1975), the review by Montgomery 
and Trussell (1986), and Grogger et al. (2002). 
4 Technically, we are estimating a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) model since we are using cross-
state variation in addition to the pre- and post-period.   6
evidence below on the adequacy of these definitions.  A strength of the pre- and post-test with comparison 
group research design is the focus on the populations most affected by policy changes.
5 
To implement this research design, we estimate the following regression model: 
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where ln N_OWBijt is the natural logarithm of the number of nonmarital births for women in demographic 
group i, state j, and year t.
 6  Equation (1) includes controls for state ( j δ ) fixed effects, state-specific 
(quadratic) time trends, and age ( k ρ ) fixed effects.  It also includes a state-year specific policy variable 
( jt policy ) indicating a period of welfare reform in state j, and time-varying state-level variables ( mjt X ) 
such as the current and one-year lag of the unemployment rate, the current and one-year lag of per-capita 
income, and the crime rate.  The policy variables ( jt policy ) are measured with a nine-month lag so as to 
reflect the political climate at the time of conception.  Finally, equation (1) includes the logarithm of 
population (ln POP), which is an estimate of the number of women in each demographic group in state j 
and year t.  Although not shown, we also allow the effect of population to differ by age.  We control for 
population instead of constructing fertility “rates” (births/population) because we have population 
                                                 
5 Moffitt (1998) presents original analyses that illustrate the importance of examining the population most affected 
by welfare reform, namely low-income or less-educated women.  We also use within-state variation in welfare 
policy, an approach advocated by Moffitt (1998). 
6 In order to obtain a closer match of policy environment to conception date, we divided years into two six month 
periods.  So there are two observations per year for each demographic group representing the number of births in the 
first six months and second six months of the year.  We assigned the policy variable in effect nine months prior to 
the first of the year for births in the first six months of the year and nine months prior to July 1 for births in the 
second six months of the year.   7
estimates by year, state, age and race, but not by education and marital status within these groups.  We 
explore the consequences of this limitation and discuss this issue in greater detail below.
7  We use least 
squares regressions weighted by the population in each state, year and demographic group to estimate the 
models.  We also adjust standard errors for clustering within state (Bertrand et al. 2002). 
To characterize the policy environment, we focus on a few key aspects of state and federal 
welfare reform: time-limited benefits, exemptions from work requirements, and sanctions for non-
compliance (Grogger et al. 2002).  In some models, we also use a characterization of welfare policy that 
is common in the literature and include dummy variables for whether a state had implemented an AFDC 
waiver or TANF.  We discuss the policy variables in greater detail below, but we note that because many 
of the policies were implemented during a relatively short interval, particularly TANF, we opted to 
control for time effects using state-specific (quadratic) trends instead of year dummy variables.  The 
advantage of this specification is that it allows for separate state trends, which statistical tests revealed to 
be significant.  The disadvantage is that it is somewhat restrictive in that it allows only for a quadratic 
trend.  However, the relatively short period of time under investigation mitigates this problem.  In 
addition, the DD analysis is intended to control for any unmeasured state-specific effects. 
We estimate equation (1) using two samples: women in the target group and women in the 
comparison group.  We also obtain DD estimates by comparing (i.e., taking the difference between) 
estimates of the parameter ( 1 α ) for these two samples.  We expect estimates associated with the treatment 
group to be more negative (less positive) than those associated with the control group because welfare 
reform should reduce fertility more in the treatment group than in the control group.  We obtain DD 
estimates by pooling the data and allowing all coefficients to differ by whether or not a woman is in the 
target or comparison group.  This is the least restrictive specification of the DD model and and 
specification tests rejected the more restrictive models. 
                                                 
7 We also estimated all models using the number of births instead of the natural logarithm of the number of births.  
Results from this alternative specification are presented in the appendix for non-Hispanic, white women.  The results 
do not differ qualitatively from those presented in the text.   8
The difference-in-differences (DD) procedure is intended to isolate the effect of welfare reform 
from other determinants of out-of-wedlock birth that vary over time, across states, and over time within 
states.  Most importantly, the DD approach potentially solves the difficult problem of controlling for 
unmeasured time-varying state effects (Moffitt 1998).  It does so by employing a within-state control or 
comparison group.  The logic is that of a classical experiment.  The treatment, or target, group consists of 
women most likely affected by changes in welfare policy.  The control, or comparison, group consists of 
women unlikely to be affected by changes in welfare policy.  Under the assumption that members of the 
treatment and control groups are affected equally by unmeasured determinants of fertility that vary over 
time within a state, DD estimates can be interpreted as a causal effect of welfare reform.  To support this 
interpretation, we include in equation (1) state-specific (quadratic) time trends, and several time-varying 
state-specific variables, which help to further control for time-varying, state-specific effects that may 
confound estimates of interest. 
  Three potential problems with the DD procedure merit comment.  First, we have defined 
treatment and control groups on the basis of marital status.  This is problematic if welfare reform affects 
marriage.  If so, estimates of the effect of welfare reform on fertility will be a combination of a behavioral 
response—changes in fertility behavior—and a compositional effect—changes in the pool of married and 
unmarried women.  Since both are effects of welfare reform, this problem is primarily a matter of 
interpretation.  However, it is also possible to estimate the behavioral response in this context.  
Accordingly, we estimate some models for a pooled sample of married and unmarried women, and use 
only educational attainment to define treatment and control groups.  In this case, the treatment group 
consists of women with a high school degree or less and the control group is women with more than a 
high school degree.  Changes in the fertility of the less-educated group associated with welfare reform 
will reflect a purely behavioral response because population composition is unlikely to be affected by 
welfare reform.  A disadvantage of this alternative approach is that fewer women in the treatment group 
are likely to be affected by changes in welfare policy, thereby muting the effect of welfare reform.   9
  The second potential problem is that the two groups only approximate true treatment and control 
groups.  Ideally, the entire treatment group would be at risk of going on public assistance and the entire 
control group would not be at risk.  Obviously, none of our treatment and control groups meet this 
standard.  We investigate the likely extent of this “contamination” problem using data from the 1994 
Current Population Survey.  Table 1 presents mean public assistance receipt by education and marital 
status for women with children (i.e., mothers).  The figures in the table clearly show that education and 
marital status are strongly correlated with public assistance receipt, and marital status has a particularly 
large effect, reflecting the eligibility criteria for welfare.  For example, approximately 57 percent of less-
educated (<12 years) unmarried mothers received public assistance in 1993 (i.e., the year prior to the 
interview) compared to only 11 percent of less-educated married mothers.  These figures illustrate that 
less-educated, unmarried women are a particularly relevant group for the study of the effect of welfare 
reform.  Education is also highly correlated with welfare receipt.  In sum, while the figures in Table 1 
demonstrate that using educational attainment and marriage to define treatment and control groups is 
reasonable, the classification error that results (i.e., the control group is, in fact, at some risk of welfare 
use) will lead to a downward bias in the DD estimates of the effect of welfare reform.  
The final potential problem with the DD procedure is whether the comparison groups are valid.  The 
answer to this question depends on whether in the absence of welfare reform, unmeasured state-specific 
time variation in fertility is the same for the target and comparison groups.  While there is no definitive 
answer to this question, one way to assess the adequacy of the comparison group is to carry out the DD 
procedure in a period where no policy change has taken place by constructing a pseudo policy that 
arbitrarily divides calendar time into a before- and after-period.  If the comparison group is adequate, DD 
estimates should be zero in such circumstances.  In our case, the period between 1990 and 1993 is one in 
which very little state welfare reform has taken place and there was as yet no federal reform.  
Accordingly, we divide the period into two: 1990-1 and 1992-3, treating 1992-3 as the after period.  We 
then obtain DD estimates for the three race/ethnic groups that are the focus of this paper.  The results 
indicate that in all but one case, DD estimates are small and not statistically significant.  The only DD   10
estimate that was non-zero and statistically significant was for the sample of Hispanic women when 
unmarried women with between 13 to 15 years of education was used as a comparison group.  Overall, 
these results provide support for the validity of our research design.   
 
Data 
  The primary data for the analysis are individual birth records submitted by hospitals to state vital 
registration offices.  All 50 states and the District of Columbia collect detailed information on individual 
births and report them to the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS).  We use the Detailed Natality 
Files made available by NCHS for the years 1990 to 1999.  Information for each birth includes date and 
place of birth, and a variety of demographic characteristics of the mother such as age, race, parity, 
education and marital status.  We limit the sample to women between the ages of 19 and 39.
8  We omit 
teens from the analysis because there is little variation in educational attainment or marital status and, as a 
result, these characteristics do not effectively sort teenagers into target and comparison groups.  
Although the NCHS Natality Files are relatively complete, some states do not collect all the 
necessary demographic data each year.  Four states—California, North Dakota, Ohio, and Washington—
did not report educational attainment in some years between 1990 and 1992.  However, by 1993, all states 
and the District of Columbia reported the education of the mother.  Perhaps the most problematic variable 
is marital status, which affects counts of nonmarital births (Ventura and Bachrach 2000).  In Michigan 
and Texas, reporting procedures resulted in severe undercounts of nonmarital births from 1990 to 1992.  
Reporting changes in California and New York City in 1995 and 1997, respectively, generated significant 
changes in the counts of nonmarital births.  Similar, though less severe problems occurred in Nevada and 
Connecticut in the late 1990s.
9  In light of these classification problems, we re-estimated some models in 
                                                 
8 We also re-estimated all models presented below using a sample of women between the ages of 19 and 29.  
Results, contained in the appendix, were similar to those presented below. 
9 In California and New York, marital status of the mother is inferred from a paternity acknowledgment or missing 
father’s name on the birth certificate.  Prior to 1996, California, Connecticut, Nevada, and New York City depended 
on a comparison of the mother’s and father’s name.  In 1997, California and Nevada changed from inference to a 
direct question and New York City changed to an inferential system comparable to upstate New York.  Finally,   11
which we used marital status to stratify the sample but omitting large states (CA, NY, MI, and TX) that 
changed data collection procedures.  The results from these models were quite similar to those reported 
below.  Therefore, we do not present these results, but they are available upon request.   
  The dependent variable in the analysis is the natural logarithm of the count of births in each 
category, defined by year, state, age, race, martial status, and education.  Alternative estimates were 
obtained using the number of births and were qualitatively the same as those reported below, but we 
include some of these estimates in the appendix for review.  The regression models include the logarithm 
of population as a control.  This specification is quite similar to using the logarithm of the  birth rate as 
the dependent variable, but the effect of the logarithm of population is not constrained to equal one.  In 
either case, it is necessary to obtain estimates of the population of women in each demographic group, but 
no data source is truly adequate for this purpose.  The Census Bureau provides population estimates by 
year, state, sex, single year of age, and race, but not by education and marital status.  Obviously, there will 
be some measurement error as a result of using the Census data since the population controls do not 
correspond perfectly to exposure to the risk of the event measured by the dependent variable. 
In order to examine whether or not this measurement error is important, we used the Current 
Population Survey to obtain population estimates for the more narrowly defined subpopulations, and re-
estimated the model using these population controls.  We limit this analysis to large states for which 
population estimates derived from the CPS are most reliable.
10  The results strongly indicated that 
measurement error resulting from the use of the Census population estimates has little effect on our 
estimates: estimates (not shown, but available from the authors) obtained using the more detailed CPS 
population estimates were very similar to those obtained using the coarser Census population estimates. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Connecticut added a direct question in mid-1998.  A review by NCHS of Connecticut’s birth data for 1998 indicated 
the proportion of births to unmarried women was somewhat higher under the inferential method than in the last six 
months when marital status was based on a direct question. 
10 Population estimates can be obtained using the weights provided by the CPS.  For small states, population 
estimates contain a significant amount of error because of the small samples and the detailed demographic 
breakdowns we are using.    12
The data on welfare policies is drawn from Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, as well as from the Urban Institute 
(www.urban.org/content/Research/NewFederalism/Data/StateDatabase/StateDatabase.htm) and the State 
Documentation Project of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (see www.cbpp.org and 
www.spdp.org/tanf.htm )  We focus on a few key aspects of state and federal welfare reform—time-
limited benefits, exemptions from work requirements, and sanctions for non-compliance—and 
characterize the policies in three ways.  In some models we consider solely whether or not a state had 
time-limited benefits (pre- or post-TANF time limit).  Time-limited benefits represent the largest financial 
change produced by welfare reform, and studies have demonstrated that time limits have significant 
effects on welfare caseloads and employment (Grogger 2000, Grogger et al. 2002; Kaushal and Kaestner 
2001).  We also characterize welfare policy as a set of dummy variables to indicate the extent of reform.  
Many of the provisions of welfare reform that we examine were implemented simultaneously by states 
through waivers or in response to PRWORA, and have been characterized as policy packages (e.g., 
Myers, Gornick and Peck, 2001; Grogger et al. 2002).   We place a state in the most extensive reform 
category if it has time-limited benefits, exempts from work requirements only women with children under 
six-months of age, and imposes financial sanctions for first time non-compliance and full sanctions for 
repeat non-compliance.  A state is in the least extensive category if it has only time-limited benefits.  The 
remaining category includes states with other combinations of these three policies.  The reference group is 
states with none of these policies.  Finally, we follow the earlier literature and estimate models that 
include dummy variables for whether a state had implemented an AFDC waiver or TANF. 
 
Results 
  We begin by reviewing time trends in aggregate data.  Rates of childbearing among unmarried 
women by race and ethnicity are displayed in Figure 1.  There is no prominent break in any of the series 
following 1996, the year of passage of PRWORA.  Rates of non-marital fertility fell steadily for black 
women, rose slightly among white women, and were essentially unchanged for Hispanic women over the   13
1990s.  Figures 2 through 4 present fertility rates for married and unmarried women with 12 or fewer 
years of education for non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and Hispanics, respectively.   
Unmarried women with little education are the populations most likely to be affected by welfare reform.  
Rates of non-marital fertility among less-educated white women generally increased over the 1990s, 
while rates of martial fertility declined in the first half of the 1990s and increased in the second half 
(Figure 2).  Figure 3 tells a similar story for less-educated black women, except that rates of non-marital 
fertility actually increased slightly in the late 1990s, after declining in the early part of the decade.  The 
increase at the end of the 1990s could be the result of delayed fertility among less-educated black women, 
since rates of teen childbearing among black women have been on the decline since the early 1990s.  
Among Hispanic women we observe a rise in non-marital childbearing to about 1994, after which rates 
remain relatively flat (Figure 4).  
  Table 2 presents regression estimates of the effect of welfare reform on the fertility of non-
Hispanic, white women.  Each of the first four columns of the table corresponds to a different sample.  
The first two columns show estimates for the two groups we consider to be most likely to be affected by 
changes in welfare policy, as these groups have relatively high rates of welfare use.  Columns three and 
four show estimates for two comparison groups—samples of women unlikely to be significantly affected 
by changes in welfare policy.  We expect the effects of welfare reform to be larger (i.e., more negative) in 
the first two columns than in columns three and four.  The last four columns show the DD estimates; for 
each of the two target groups, we calculate two DD estimates by alternating the comparison group.  
Within each column, we present estimates from three separate regression models that differ by 
the characterization of welfare policy.  The top panel (row one) includes two dummy variables denoting 
AFDC waivers and TANF.  The middle panel (row two) includes an indicator of whether or not a state 
had time-limited benefits, which may have been either pre- or post-TANF, as eight states implemented 
time limits as a part of an AFDC waiver prior to TANF.  Finally, the bottom panel (row three) presents 
estimates from a model that characterizes welfare policy by the extent of reform from most extensive to 
least extensive with the reference category being no reform.  Again, this characterization of welfare   14
reform policies does not differentiate between policies implemented as part of an AFDC waiver or 
through TANF. 
  Estimates in the top panel of Table 2 indicate that, in general, AFDC waivers and TANF were 
associated with an increase in fertility for all four demographic groups.  AFDC waivers had a relatively 
large effect indicating increases in fertility of approximately six percent.  However, only one of the 
estimates is statistically significant, and in this case only marginally so (0.10<p<0.05).  Difference-in-
differences estimates are shown in the last four columns and all of the estimates are statistically 
insignificant and most are small in magnitude.  The largest estimate suggests that TANF was associated 
with a three percent increase in fertility for unmarried women with less than 12 years of education.  Row 
two presents the estimates of the effect of time-limited benefits.  These estimates indicate that time-
limited benefits were not significantly associated with the fertility of non-Hispanic, white women.  All of 
the estimates are small and statistically insignificant.  DD estimates are also statistically insignificant and 
small—the largest effect indicates a decrease in fertility of 1.2 percent.     
  The next estimates discussed are from models that characterize welfare reform in more detail, and 
these are listed in the bottom panel of the table.  Specifically, in this model, we group states according to 
whether or not they had one or more of the following: time-limited benefits, exemptions from work 
requirements for women with very young children, and financial sanctions for non-compliance.  Again, 
we expect fertility to decline more in states with more extensive reforms.  Estimates in panel three 
confirm our earlier findings, and generally indicate that welfare reform is not associated with fertility of 
unmarried and low-educated women.  Only one of the estimates in columns one through four is 
statistically significant (marginally) and all the estimates are relatively small—suggesting effects of less 
than six percent.  Virtually all of the DD estimates are also statistically insignificant and small in 
magnitude. Overall, estimates in Table 2 suggest that welfare reform had little effect on the fertility of 
non-Hispanic, white women. 
As noted, defining treatment and control groups on the basis of marital status is potentially 
problematic.  Welfare reform may have affected marital status, in which case the estimates in Table 2   15
would confound the behavioral response and a selection effect.  Importantly, both effects are due to 
welfare reform and thus, estimates in Table 2 are of interest even if marital status is endogenous.  One 
way to sort out the two effects is to drop marital status from the definition of target and control groups.  
As Table 1 reveals, there is significant variation in welfare use among women defined on the basis of 
education alone; among mothers with less than a high school degree, 33 percent report receiving welfare 
benefits in the prior year where as only eight percent of mothers with between 13 and 15 years of 
education report such income.  Therefore, we use less educated women as the target group and more 
educated women as the comparison group.  Table 5 presents estimates from the analysis that uses these 
groups. 
Estimates in Table 5 pertaining to non-Hispanic, white women are quite consistent with those in 
Table 2.  Most of the estimates of welfare reform policy are small (< six percent) and statistically 
insignificant.  AFDC waivers and TANF are generally positively related to fertility while the other 
measures of welfare reform are more mixed.  In this case, however, DD estimates are consistently 
positive and most are statistically significant, although all are small, suggesting increases in fertility of 
less than three percent.  In sum, the estimates in Table 5 do not suggest that those in Table 2 are 
significantly affected by selection effects resulting from welfare reform’s effect on marital status.  Instead 
they confirm the results of Table 2 and suggest that state and federal welfare reform had little effect, or a 
small positive effect on fertility. 
Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of welfare reform on the fertility of non-Hispanic, black 
women, and has the same format as Table 2.  Estimates in columns one through four of the top panel 
indicate that AFDC waivers are negatively associated with fertility and TANF positively associated with 
fertility.  Most of the TANF estimates are statistically significant and indicate that fertility increased 
between three to seven percent post TANF for the demographic groups shown in columns one through 
four; larger effects were found for members of the target group.  DD estimates of the effect of AFDC 
waivers are mixed and only one is marginally significant.  This suggests that AFDC waivers were not 
associated with fertility for non-Hispanic, black women.  In contrast, DD estimates of the effect of TANF   16
indicate a positive association between TANF and fertility and half the estimates are statistically 
significant and all are of the same approximate magnitude; estimates indicate that TANF was associated 
with a three to four percent increase in fertility of low-educated, unmarried black women.   
Estimates of the effect of time-limited benefits, presented in row two, also indicate that this 
aspect of welfare reform was positively related to fertility.  Estimates in columns one and two are 
statistically significant and indicate that time-limited benefits are associated with a four percent increase 
in fertility.  Similar effects of time-limited benefits are found for less-educated married women (column 
four).  However, time-limited benefits are not associated with the fertility of unmarried women with 
between 13 and 15 years of education.  DD estimates of the effect of time-limited benefits are mixed and 
differ according to the comparison group used to construct them.  They suggest that time-limited benefits 
were associated with a zero to four percent increase in fertility. 
   Finally, estimates in the bottom panel of Table 3 indicate that welfare reform as characterized was 
positively associated with the fertility of less-educated, unmarried women (columns one and two).  About 
two thirds of the estimates in columns one and two are statistically significant and suggest an increase in 
fertility of two to six percent.  However, there is little evidence of a dose-response effect.  Estimates in 
columns three and four are more mixed in sign and none are statistically significant.  DD estimates are 
also mixed in sign and most are not statistically significant.  So, as was the case for non-Hispanic, white 
women, welfare reform does not appear to be associated with reductions in the relative fertility of less-
educated, unmarried non-Hispanic black women.  If anything, TANF was associated with a small increase 
in fertility of two to four percent. 
We also obtained estimates of the effect of welfare reform on the fertility of non-Hispanic, black 
women using target and comparison groups defined by education alone.  These estimates are shown in 
Table 5.  They confirm the findings just reviewed.  TANF and policies highly correlated with it such as 
time-limited benefits were positively associated with fertility.  DD estimates in Table 5 suggest an effect 
of four percent.  Estimates in Table 5 also support the argument that welfare induced selection into 
marriage did not have a significant effect on estimates in Table 2.   17
The third population we studied was Hispanic women, who can be of any race.  Estimates of the 
effect of welfare reform on the fertility of this group of women are presented in Table 4.  As noted, the 
reporting of marital status has been inconsistent in some states.  We expected Hispanics to be particularly 
affected by problems with marital status reporting because of the large concentrations of Hispanics in 
states with reporting inconsistencies such as California, Texas and New York.  Moreover, the way that 
California and New York altered reporting procedures is most likely to have affected Hispanics (Ventura 
and Bachrach 2000).  In light of this concern, we re-estimated all models excluding states with known 
reporting problems: California and New York in all years, and Michigan and Texas prior to 1993.  The 
estimates from these models were very similar to those reported in Table 4.  Therefore, we do not report 
them, but they are available from authors. 
  Estimates in the top panel of Table 4 indicate a relatively large negative association between 
AFDC waivers and the fertility of low-educated, unmarried women (columns one and two).  Estimates 
indicate that AFDC waivers were associated with a statistically significant, eight to nine percent decrease 
in the fertility of these two groups.  A similar effect is found for unmarried women with between 13 and 
15 years of education.  In contrast, AFDC waivers are associated with an increase in the fertility of low-
educated married Hispanic women.  Consistent with this pattern, DD estimates suggest very different 
effects depending on which comparison group is used.  If the estimates in column three are used, the DD 
estimates are small, positive and not statistically significant.  If the estimates in column four are used, the 
DD estimates are large, negative and statistically significant.  Our earlier analysis of the adequacy of the 
comparison groups suggests that married women with less than 12 years of education are the preferred 
comparison group.  On this basis, we are led to prefer the DD estimates constructed using this comparison 
group, although we recognize that there is no definitive justification for this decision.
11  Thus, our 
preferred estimates indicate that AFDC waivers had a negative and statistically association with fertility 
of Hispanic women.  One possible explanation for this finding is the geographic concentration of   18
Hispanics, which suggests that only a few states that had AFDC waivers and large Hispanic 
concentrations may be driving this result—notably California.  Therefore, we re-estimated the model 
dropping California.  In this case, the DD estimates of the effect of AFDC remained negative and 
significant although a bit smaller in magnitude—approximately seven percent.  Finally, estimates of the 
effect of AFDC waivers in Table 5 are inconsistent with those in Table 4.  When only education status is 
used to define target and comparison groups, estimates of the effect of AFDC waivers are small and not 
statistically significant.    
Estimates of the effect of TANF are positive and statistically significant in the first three columns 
and negative and insignificant in column four.  Given our preferences, we focus on the DD estimates 
constructed using the column 3 estimates.  In these cases, DD estimates indicate that TANF had a 
negative and statistically insignificant association with fertility.  The opposite characterization applies to 
the other DD estimates. 
The middle panel of Table 4 shows estimates of the effect of time-limited benefits.  Most 
estimates are positive and most are not statistically significant.  DD estimates associated with time-limited 
benefits are also not significant.  Finally, the bottom panel lists the estimates of the effect of welfare 
reform characterized as most to least extensive.  Estimates in columns one through four are quite mixed 
and most are statistically insignificant.  Similarly, DD estimates are mostly insignificant and have mixed 
signs.  In sum, estimates of the effect of time-limited benefits and other aspects of reform, as 
characterized in the bottom panel, suggest that welfare reform was not statistically associated with the 
fertility of non-Hispanic women.  Further supporting this conclusion are estimates in Table 5, obtained 




                                                                                                                                                             
11 For example, Figure 4 is inconsistent with the findings from the DD analysis for 1991 to 1993 that was used to 
assess the adequacy of the comparison groups since the trend for the unmarried women with 13 to 15 years of   19
Conclusions 
Non-marital births are considered among the most important avenues to welfare dependence.  
Indeed, eligibility for federal cash assistance is limited to families with children, and eligibility for 
families headed by a married couple has been quite restricted.  Consequently, the welfare caseload 
consists predominantly of unmarried women and their children, and unmarried women have high rates of 
welfare receipt.  This fact, along with the relatively poor outcomes of children from single-parent 
families, motivated the authors of the 1996 welfare reform law (PRWORA).  Changes in welfare policy 
that made cash assistance temporary and participation in the program more onerous were, in part, 
intended to discourage couples from having non-marital births.  We have investigated whether PRWORA 
and earlier state welfare “waiver” reform efforts from which PRWORA drew many of its provisions, were 
associated with a reduction in nonmarital fertility in the 1990s.  The evidence we presented suggests that 
welfare reform had relatively little effect on the fertility of less-educated, unmarried women.  If anything, 
AFDC waivers were associated with a negative effect of seven to 10 percent on Hispanic women’s 
fertility, and federal welfare reform was associated with a small positive effect of two to three percent for 
white and black women.  However, the absence of a consistent set of findings--for example a similar 
effect of a given policy for women of all race/ethnic groups, and the predominance of insignificant 
effects-- leads us to conclude that, in general, state and federal reform have not affected fertility.  
The absence of a finding of a significant effect of welfare reform on non-marital fertility is 
consistent with earlier literature that has found little relationship between AFDC benefit levels and 
fertility (Moffitt 1992).  However, more recent studies have found consistent evidence of effects, although 
modest in size (Kearney 2001, Levine 2002).  In comparison, our lack of a finding is surprising.  Previous 
analyses have primarily relied upon variation in benefit levels across states and across time to identify 
effects of welfare on fertility.  PRWORA and, sometimes, earlier state reforms represent the elimination 
of the entitlement to a benefit, a far more dramatic change in financial incentives than marginal or even 
moderate shifts in the benefit levels.  
                                                                                                                                                             
education appears to be similar to that of low-educated unmarried women.   20
It is certainly possible that there has been an effect of welfare reform on non-marital fertility that 
we were unable to detect.  For example, there may be strong cohort patterns in non-marital fertility; thus, 
exposure during the early teen years to a policy regime without a welfare entitlement might produce large 
behavioral changes for such “entering” cohorts but little change among older cohorts (e.g., Rindfuss 
1991).  In this case, a study that focuses on the cohort of younger women who entered their childbearing 
years after the imposition of welfare reform might uncover more evidence of an effect.  We attempted to 
address this issue here by limiting the sample to women between the ages of 19 and 29 and re-estimating 
all models, but there was no evidence of an effect of welfare reform on the fertility of this group (results 
in Appendix Table 2).  Kaestner, Korenman and O’Neill (2003) also examined the effect of welfare 
reform on teens and found some evidence that welfare reform has decreased disadvantaged teen’s non-
marital fertility. 
Another possible explanation for our findings is that more time may be needed for couples or 
women to adjust fertility behavior to policy changes.  The argument against this hypothesis is the 
evidence that welfare reform has already had a substantial effect on work effort and welfare receipt 
(Kaushal and Kaestner 2001; CEA 1999; Schoeni and Blank 2000; Grogger 2000).  Nonetheless, work 
and welfare use should be expected to respond more quickly since the actual provisions of the law 
(although not the rhetoric) were more clearly targeted to changing work effort and welfare dependency 
than to promoting marriage or reducing nonmarital fertility.  21
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Table 1 
Proportion of Mothers Receiving Public Assistance By Education and Marital Status, 1994 
 
Demographic Group  Received Public 
Assistance in Past Year 
Less than High School   32.6 
High School Degree  15.6 
More than High School (13 to 15 years of education)    7.6 
   
Less than High School Degree – Married     11.3 
Less than High School Degree – Not Married   56.7 
   
High School Degree – Married     4.5 
High School Degree – Not Married   36.3 
   
More than High School (13 to 15 years of education) – Married     1.9 
More than High School (13 to 15 years of education) – Not Married  18.5 
Source: 1994 Current Population Survey; sample includes only women with children.  
2
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